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Ideas about what users think and do have always had an important 
place in the theory and practice of design.1 These ideas are especially 
important when trying to understand how users interact with 
designed systems, whether those systems are physical products, 
digital interfaces, or more abstract services. In recent years, 
traditional concerns for the users’ efficiency, safety, and satisfaction 
have expanded to also include issues like meaning, engagement, 
and fulfilment.2 Consequently, attention is now focused on 
how interactions are situated in contexts of use,3 how users are 
constructed during interaction,4 and how interaction can itself be 
aesthetic.5 These broader concerns reflect a more humane approach 
to users, respecting them as active, aware, and intelligent people 
rather than just viewing them as being less predictable than the 
designed systems with which they interact.6
This article suggests that fully respecting users’ sophistication 
means acknowledging that they have the capacity to recognize that 
designed systems have been designed. That is, as users interact with 
systems, they may reason about the design processes from which 
these systems result. Such reasoning may help users predict the 
behavior of systems, especially when they consider how designers 
might have expected users to act. Furthermore, this reasoning may 
also influence other aspects of how users experience a system, 
including the meaning that it holds for them, their engagement 
with it, and the fulfillment that it brings. This article refers to these 
phenomena as users adopting a design stance towards the system.
The term “design stance” was coined by philosopher 
Daniel Dennett, who proposed that an effective way for users to 
reason about how a system will behave is to think about what it 
was designed to do.7 The design stance and other related concepts 
have received a great deal of attention from philosophy, psychology, 
and a broad range of other disciplines that are concerned with the 
interpretation and use of artifacts. Despite Dennett’s prominence, 
and despite the relevance of the design stance to how people interact 
with designed systems, this concept has attracted relatively little 
discussion in the literature on interaction and design. This literature 
also contains very few empirical studies that can be related to 
the design stance, and in any case, those studies that are relevant 
primarily focus on other phenomena. Consequently, the role of the 
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design stance in user-system interaction has still not been thoroughly 
explored, either conceptually or empirically.
The objective of this article is to encourage a focus on the 
design stance so that its relevance to user-system interaction might 
be better understood. To support this goal, the relationship between 
designers, users, and systems is presented, first as it is conventionally 
understood and then in the way it is considered here. Next, the 
design stance is outlined in the terms in which Dennett introduced 
it, but it is then strengthened and broadened through references 
to other related work. Attending to this other work demonstrates 
that the design stance holds implications for studying not only how 
things are used, but also how they are experienced. It further shows 
how the design stance is related to—and yet distinct from—other 
concepts with which interaction researchers have been concerned. 
With the design stance defined and contextualized, its analytic 
value is then illustrated by applying it to a detailed account of an 
interaction episode.
The User’s Image of the Designer
In an effort to understand how people interact with designed 
systems, cognitive studies have traditionally emphasized the idea 
that users construct a “mental model” of how a system works, 
and that they use that model to interact with the system.8 This 
perspective is often represented with a diagram (see Figure 1) that 
depicts three key things: (1) The designer has an image of how a 
system will work and how the user will interact with it,9 (2) the 
system presents the user with certain opportunities for actions and 
offers feedback in response to those actions, and (3) the user forms an 
image of how the system works based on their interactions with it.10 
This diagram exists in various forms, but all forms depict how users 
Figure 1
The designer thinks about the system and the 
user, and the user thinks about the system.
8 For example, Stephen J. Payne, “Users’ 
Mental Models: the Very Ideas,” in HCI 
Models, Theories, and Frameworks, 
ed. John M. Carroll (San Francisco, CA: 
Morgan Kaufmann, 2003); Martina A. 
Sasse, “Users’ Models of Computer 
Systems,” in Models in the Mind, ed. 
Yvonne Rogers, Andrew Rutherford, and 
Peter A. Bibby (London, UK: Academic 
Press, 1992), 225–40; Richard M. Young, 
“The Machine Inside the Machine: 
Users’ Models of Pocket Calculators,” 
International Journal of Man-Machine 
Studies 15:1 (1981): 51–85; Nancy 
Staggers and A. F. Norcio, “Mental 
Models: Concepts for Human-Computer 
Interaction Research,” International 
Journal of Man-Machine Studies 38:4 
(1993): 587–605.
9 This capacity for theory of mind may 
actually be a basic requirement for 
designing. Andy Dong, “Biological First 
Principles for Design Competence.” AI 
EDAM 24:04 (2010): 460–1.
10 For example, see Klaus Krippendorff and 
Reinhart Butter, “Product Semantics: 
Exploring the Symbolic Qualities of 
Form,” Innovation: The Journal of the 
Industrial Designers Society of America 
3:2 (1984): 6; Donald A. Norman, The 
Psychology of Everyday Things (New 
York, NY: Basic Books, 1988),16.
DesignIssues: Volume 27, Number 4 Autumn 201118
interact with systems independently of designers, and how designers 
communicate with users through the systems they design.11
In the traditional mental models approach, the user ’s 
understanding of the system seemingly develops without the user 
being aware that the system has been designed. There is no explicit 
acknowledgement that users have the capacity to recognize that they 
are users—users whose interactions with the system will have been 
anticipated. As such, in Figure 1 the designer is viewed as having 
an image both of the system and of the user’s interaction with it, 
but the user is viewed simply as having an image of the system. 
What is not shown is that through interaction with the system the 
user might also form an image of the designer, and also an image of 
the designer’s image of the user. This image that the user holds of 
the designer need not be well formed and need not be accurate for 
it to influence the user’s response to the system (see Figure 2). Note 
that unlike Figure 1, which presents acts of design and acts of use 
in the same view, Figure 2 only presents acts of use; the designer is 
imagined by the user, and only the system, the user, and the user’s 
thoughts are actually depicted.
If users were to view technological systems as a consequence 
of human thought and action, they could reason about those systems 
on the grounds that they result from intentional design processes. 
This orientation towards the design process might allow users to 
better explore, discover, and anticipate the behavior of technological 
systems because they would recognize that use of those systems 
has been considered and designed for. For example, such awareness 
of design might help users to determine where a particular feature 
could be (“where would the designer have put it?”) or how something 
might be operated (“how was I expected to use it?”). In approaching 
technology in this way, users could exploit their wealth of experience 
Figure 2
The user thinks about the designer of the 
system, and also about the designer’s 
thoughts about the user.
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in social interactions, leveraging their knowledge of how people 
think about people to understand how a designer might have 
thought about them. Where this social knowledge is more developed 
than users’ technical knowledge, their awareness that the system has 
been designed might promote interactions that are more effective 
and more rewarding. In other words, it may be better for users to 
think about why the system is the way it is, rather than to just think 
about what the system is or how it works.
The Design Stance
The perspective illustrated in Figure 2 can be related to Dennett’s 
design stance. This is just one of three stances that Dennett claims 
people adopt when they are making predictions about how things 
will behave.12 On Dennett’s account, for relatively simple things (e.g., 
doors and chairs), people can predict the behavior of objects purely 
on the basis of physical structures obeying physical laws. In adopting 
this “physical stance” toward objects, people use some intuitive 
grasp of physics to predict that, for example, pushing the back of a 
chair beyond a certain point will cause it to topple over. (Compare 
the adoption of this stance with the perception of “affordances,” a 
concept that is typically used to emphasize a relational capacity for 
action rather than an intuitive means of prediction.)13
For things that are more complicated than doors and 
chairs (e.g., clocks and calculators), most people have insufficient 
knowledge of the physical structure and workings to reliably predict 
how those objects operate simply by adopting the physical stance. 
Instead, people adopt a “design stance” toward such objects, which 
allows them to make these predictions based on the assumption that 
the object will behave as it is designed to behave. Having some idea 
of what a calculator is supposed to do when a button is pressed gives 
people some clues as to what it might actually do. Or, with respect 
to computers, and in Dennett’s own words,
[M]ost users of computers have not the foggiest idea what 
physical principles are responsible for the computer’s 
highly reliable, and hence predictable, behaviour. But if 
they have a good idea of what the computer is designed 
to do (a description of its operation at any one of the 
many possible levels of abstraction), they can predict this 
behaviour with great accuracy and reliability, subject to 
disconfirmation only in cases of physical malfunction.14
Although Dennett refers to the users’ ideas about design, in recent 
discussions of the design stance, considerable debate has arisen as 
to whether design stance reasoning is based simply on knowledge 
of the system’s function (without reference to the designer’s 
intentions) or whether it is based on knowledge of the designer’s 
intended function.15 However, in contrast to the biological organisms 
with which Dennett is primarily concerned, the functions of 
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technical systems are generally taken to depend on the intentions 
of the system’s creator. Therefore, to adopt a design stance toward 
a technical system is to reason about what the designer wanted 
and about how the designer acted. Throughout this article, it is this 
stronger version of the design stance (or the “designer stance”) with 
which we are concerned.16
If the behavior of simple things can be predicted with the 
physical stance, and more complicated things with the design stance, 
Dennett suggests that a third stance is adopted for things that are yet 
more complicated still. For things like animals and people, neither 
the physical stance nor the design stance is effective; instead we must 
adopt an “intentional stance.” Here, intentions are attributed to the 
things themselves, and their behavior is predicted on the basis that 
they will behave in ways that suit their own goals. For example, if 
we recognize that an animal is hungry, then we can predict how that 
animal will behave when it is presented with food by expecting that 
it will act to satisfy its drives.
The adoption of the intentional stance need not be reserved 
just for truly intentional systems; someone might predict the 
behavior of a computer by adopting the intentional stance (e.g., if 
its sophistication suggests that it is taking goal-directed actions). 
Similarly, someone might adopt the physical stance to predict the 
behavior of a calculator (e.g., if it were being dropped), and someone 
might predict the behavior of an animal’s heart by adopting the 
design stance (e.g., if Mother Nature were thought to have designed 
it to serve some function). As such, although it might at first seem 
that the stance a person adopts is determined by the type of entity 
with which they interact, it is really determined pragmatically by 
some trade-off between the reliability of the predictions that a stance 
permits and the efforts required to make those predictions from that 
stance.17
The Scope of the Design Stance
Dennett’s three stances have been very influential and have partic-
ularly attracted the attention of philosophers concerned with the 
mind, its workings, and its evolution.18 However, psychologists 
have also taken an interest in Dennett, and the design stance is now 
explicitly associated with a significant stream of experimental work.19 
This work has shown that people name and categorize artifacts 
according to what they believe the designers’ intentions were. For 
example, a collection of things called “clocks” might all be considered 
to be  clocks even if those things take different physical forms (e.g., 
analogue and digital clocks), and even if they do not all tell the 
time (e.g., because they are broken or need a new battery). This is 
because these things were all intended to be clocks, and their form 
and behavior are just clues to this intention. Conversely, something 
might very well resemble a clock (perhaps a child’s drawing) and 
something might accidently permit the time to be read (perhaps the 
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moving shadow from a building), but if people don’t think those 
things were intended to be clocks, then those things won’t be thought 
of as being clocks.20
Beyond psychological research, and independently of 
Dennett, the inference of creative intentions is considered to be of 
central importance to the interpretation of many acts and media.21 
This perspective is notably influential in the study of spoken and 
written communication,22 but it also is important when considering 
paintings,23 prehistoric relics,24 architecture,25 cinema,26 consumer 
products,27 branding,28 and advertising.29 Although the disciplines 
that study these various kinds of artifacts use different terminology 
(e.g., “intent attribution,” “inference of intention,” “persuasion 
knowledge”), they all describe phenomena closely related to 
the design stance, and all consider those phenomena to strongly 
influence how artifacts are experienced. The attribution of design 
intention therefore affects not only what an artifact is, but also what 
it means and how it is responded to.
Those disciplines that focus on how people construct an 
image of an artifact’s creator implicitly invoke the idea that people 
have beliefs about other people’s thoughts. More formally, the 
concept of folk psychology (or naïve psychology) is used to describe 
this common-sense knowledge of cognition that lay people use to 
predict and explain the behavior of others.30 This knowledge is not 
always correct and does not always permit accurate predictions,31 
but it is still influential in determining how people interact socially.32 
In these terms, we might consider whether people possess a folk 
knowledge of design that tells them how a technical system came 
into existence, what decisions have been made about it, and what 
drove those decisions. Such reasoning involves folk psychology 
being applied through abduction: Rather than predicting human 
behavior on the basis of some naïve understanding of psychology, 
people explain the results of human behavior (the system) on the 
basis of some more or less naïve understanding of the design process 
and the psychology behind it.33
From across the range of disciplines that have been concerned 
with something like Dennett’s design stance, we see that when 
people reflect on the agent responsible for a system, these reflections 
might influence more than just predictions about that system’s 
behavior. Instead, these reflections might also influence the way 
in which people categorize what a system is, understand why it 
is there, and assess its aesthetic and symbolic value. To cover this 
range, the term “design stance” is here used in a broader sense than 
Dennett himself used it. However, there is good precedent for this 
expansion in the large body of psychological work that is conducted 
under the heading of “design stance” research.34 Consequently, in this 
article, “design stance” is used to refer to the way in which users’ 
engagement with systems is mediated by their conception of the 
design activities from which those systems result.
20 H. Clark Barrett, Stephen Laurence, and 
Eric Margolis, “Artifacts and Original 
Intent: a Cross-Cultural Perspective on 
the Design Stance,” Journal of Cognition 
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The Design Stance in Human-Computer Interaction
Although concepts like the design stance have excited those 
disciplines concerned with the interpretation of artifacts, this 
emphasis on interpretation disguises a lack of attention given to 
the design stance in studies of interaction. Because of its emphasis 
on man-machine relations, a natural place to look for such work is 
the field of human-computer interaction (HCI). However, Dennett’s 
stances—and especially his design stance—have attracted much less 
attention in the HCI field than might be expected. For example, there 
are only a few general HCI texts in which Dennett is mentioned, 
and in those texts it is typically his intentional stance which is 
emphasized.35 Dennett’s three stances are distinguished from each 
other in some more specific theoretical discussions,36 where they 
are related to alternative categorizations of reasoning offered by 
Rasmussen,37 Pylyshyn,38 and Zuboff.39 However, in none of these 
works is a concept like the design stance offered as a challenge to 
conventional ways of understanding how users might appraise or 
interact with systems.
Moving away from general HCI theory, Dennett’s stances 
appear to be of most interest to those studying how humans interact 
with robots, animated characters, and other, seemingly sentient 
devices.40 In particular, Terada and colleagues have conducted 
experiments to discern which stances people adopt when responding 
to different types of robots,41 artifacts,42 and entities.43 In these labora-
tory-based studies, the researchers applied verbal and non-verbal 
self-report techniques to elicit the stances that users adopted with 
respect to the systems they interacted with or observed. Although 
all three of Dennett’s stances were considered (and ostensibly 
revealed), Terada and colleagues interpreted the design stance as 
simply requiring consideration of a system’s function, rather than as 
requiring the attribution of intentions to the system’s creator. Their 
perspective is therefore fundamentally different from that developed 
in this article, but in any case, it is actually the user’s adoption of the 
intentional stance that they are promoting.
While HCI robotics promotes the intentional stance, there is 
work in HCI semiotics that seems to promote something like the 
design stance, albeit without reference to Dennett. In an independent 
argument, de Souza says that technology users may recognize that 
they are not interacting with autonomous machines, but with the 
product of a rational human mind.44 This recognition allows users to 
interact with technology by exploiting their expectations about the 
intellectual and creative behavior of other people—the designers. In 
this sense, de Souza views the designed system as a designer-to-user 
message, the meaning of which is: “Here is my [the designer’s] 
understanding of who you [the user] are, what I’ve learned you want 
or do, in which preferred ways, and why.”45 de Souza and Leitão thus 
propose that designers follow a process of “semiotic engineering,” 
27 Crilly et al., “Design as Communication;” 
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which can guide users toward inferring the design rationale from 
which the system results.46
Although work on semiotic engineering has suggested that 
something like the design stance is adopted by users, the focus 
of that work is quite different from what is proposed here. First, 
semiotic engineering originates in linguistics, and the interfaces to 
which it has been applied predominantly use conventional symbols 
in the form of verbal instructions, menu lists, and graphical icons. 
Second, this attention to explicit communication leads to asking 
questions primarily about voice: Who is seen to be saying what to 
whom? Third, it is the designer who is emphasized, including the 
messages that the designer can send and the interpretations that 
the designer can encourage. Consequently, there is no focus on how 
users might respond to interfaces that are less explicitly communi-
cative (e.g., physical interfaces), and the reported qualitative studies 
do not reveal that users have some conception of the designer.47 
Therefore, although semiotic engineering promotes the idea that 
users adopt something like the design stance, it is actually that this 
idea is assumed; it is not elaborated on or investigated directly.
The idea that users adopt the design stance, and that 
this should be encouraged, stands in opposition to the work of 
researchers who have focused on “the media equation,” a theory 
which proposes that people respond to media (e.g., computers) in 
a manner equivalent to how they respond to people. For example, 
in considering how people orient to sources, Reeves and Nass 
assert that consumers do not think of advertisers (but compare 
this with modern marketing theory),48 and that computer users do 
not consider computer programmers.49 To test this theory, Sundar 
and Nass conducted an experiment in which one group of partic-
ipants interacted with computers that were labeled and referred 
to as “Computer,” and another group interacted with computers 
that were labeled and referred to as the work of a “Programmer.” 
Because the researchers found clear differences in how the different 
participant groups appraised the computers, they concluded that 
“humans working with a computer are not orienting to an unseen 
programmer but instead are interacting with the computer as a 
distinct social actor.”50
It is in explicit opposition to Dennett that proponents of the 
media equation claim that users do not normally consider designers 
during interaction. However, these researchers do acknowledge that 
users think about the designer of the system when things go wrong, 
and that these thoughts are useful when reasoning about how to put 
things right.51 Their experimental results might thus be reinterpreted 
as suggesting that when users adopt the design stance, this changes 
their experience of the systems with which they are interacting. They 
report that this change in experience led users to consider the system 
as being less friendly, less playful, and less effective.52 However, the 
users in these studies were forced into adopting the design stance; 
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18–34.
34 For example, see Barrett, et al. “Artifacts 
and Original Intent;” Margaret Anne 
Defeyter and Tim P. German, “Acquiring 
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nothing had gone wrong, and users were not reasoning about how 
to put things right. Questions remain over what circumstances might 
promote the spontaneous adoption of the design stance, and what 
effects the design stance might have under these circumstances.
The Design Stance in User-System Interaction: an Account
To explore how the design stance might be adopted and what 
possible effects its adoption might have, what follows is a detailed 
hypothetical account of an interaction episode. The account permits 
easy reference to a concrete example and conveniently covers a 
number of different aspects of the design stance within one extended 
episode. Although a single comprehensive account of this sort may 
be difficult to achieve empirically, the expectation is that individual 
components of such an account could be generated through experi-
mental, observational, or self-report methods.53 In the account, a 
user (called Ursula) adopts the design stance as she reasons about 
the location of a control within a motor car. The paragraphs are 
numbered to permit later analytic commentary on specific incidents 
in the overall episode.
1. A friend of ours, Ursula, doesn’t own a motor car but has 
hired one for the weekend so that she can visit her family. Once 
her journey has started, the weather becomes increasingly overcast, 
and when a light drizzle starts up, the windshield wipers are soon 
required. Ursula, who used to own some other brand of car, instinc-
tively reaches for the wrong control and activates the turn signals 
instead of the wipers. In doing so, she experiences some frustration 
as she wonders why these things can’t be the same for each car 
model. As Ursula continues along the busy road, the gusts from 
passing trucks mean that the windshield requires regular wiping 
and regular spraying from the washer nozzles. 
2. Ursula’s rental car had not received a proper service before 
being rented out to her, and it soon runs out of windshield washer 
fluid. The car and the washer system are now brought to our friend’s 
attention as she pulls into a service station to fill the washer reservoir. 
Not seeing any convenient source of water that could be used to fill 
the reservoir, Ursula decides to buy some bottled water from the 
service station. Looking for a large bottle of water in the refrigerator, 
she is struck for the first time by the motifs of purity that adorn the 
bottles. The pictures of mountains and streams stand in stark contrast 
to the image that she has of her future self pouring this expensive 
water into the car’s washer reservoir.
3. Once back at the car, Ursula sits down in the driver’s seat 
to activate the hood release mechanism. She reaches under the 
steering wheel to feel about for the lever that she expects to find 
there, but she doesn’t find it. Ursula swings her head down to the 
side to get better a look at the situation and is confronted with a 
smooth, featureless panel. She sits back up and looks quizzically at 
the dashboard, examining each of the switches and their associated 
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symbols. She vaguely expects that one of these switches will have 
a little pictogram of a car with its hood open, but none of them do. 
Becoming frustrated, Ursula opens the glove compartment to find 
the owner’s manual for the car, but the manual is missing.
4. During her time looking for a lever, a switch, or a symbol, 
Ursula mutters things like “where is it?,” “where can it be?,” and 
finally “where have they put it?” Ursula has now looked in all the 
places that she expected the control to be, all the places that she 
thought it plausibly could be, and has now started to think about 
where some unspecified agent (the “they”) could or would have 
placed it. Ursula starts hopelessly flipping down the sun visors to 
see what’s behind them but mutters “no… they wouldn’t have put it 
there,” and as she opens the glove compartment again to search for 
the lever, she says, more emphatically “oh, that’s ridiculous, I can’t 
have been expected to look in here!” Thinking about where they could 
possibly have thought she’d look, Ursula next examines the space 
between the front seats and the space between the driver’s seat and 
the door. Neither approach is successful.
5. Feeling that she has exhausted the possibilities inside the 
car, Ursula steps outside. She peers at the front of the hood but sees 
only a lip to pull up on, with no obvious catch or switch to release it. 
The only prominent detail is the badge that marks the brand of the 
car, a badge that is covered, like the rest of the car, in a thin layer of 
road spray. “It could be a button…” she says, but even as she reaches 
toward it, she hesitates, thinking “…but it gets so filthy; they couldn’t 
have wanted me to touch that.” As she pushes on the badge it doesn’t 
move in, but it does feel loose. She presses it again, and as it pivots 
slightly upward, she shifts the direction in which she applies her 
force; the badge now swings cleanly out of the way, revealing the 
keyhole that opens the hood.
6. With the keyhole now exposed, Ursula is relieved to have 
found her way in and also irritated that she had to search for so long. 
This irritation is diffuse, directed partly at the car, partly at herself, 
and partly at those responsible for the system. As Ursula twists the 
key in the lock, she notes that she’s never had to use a key to open 
the hood before, but reasons that without the key, the hood wouldn’t 
be secure. “That’s clever!” she says, as she considers the problem that 
someone must have solved and as she recognizes that the car badge 
stops the keyhole from getting too dirty. With the hood now open, 
the remainder of the refill procedure proceeds without incident, and 
Ursula is soon back on her way, with this episode now thankfully 
behind her.
The Design Stance in User-System Interaction: a Commentary
The preceding account relates to the design stance in various ways. 
To illustrate this, the following analytic commentary considers 
each stage of the episode in turn, using paragraph numbers that 
correspond to those used in the account.
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1. Ursula’s first reported awareness of the car is when she 
experiences some mild frustration over the differing placement of 
the controls in different car models. In activating the wrong control, 
she has become aware of an undesirable situation (variation in 
control placement across models) and has imagined some preferable 
alternative (standardization). Had she continued to reflect on this 
matter, she might have reasoned about why things are the way they 
are (perhaps constructing some historical cause) and imagined how 
change might be brought about (perhaps imagining some system 
of legislation or incentive). If these thoughts brought design—both 
its failings and its potential—into Ursula’s awareness, this would 
increase the likelihood of her adopting the design stance in future 
interactions with technology.
2. In purchasing water to fill up the washer fluid reservoir, 
Ursula notices the motifs of purity on the bottles in a way that she 
has not done before. The use to which she is about to put the water 
makes the packaging features incongruous and thus conspicuous. 
Just as the accidental activation of the turn signal control brought the 
car to her attention before, the rhetoric of the bottle design is now 
more prominent than it would otherwise have been. If Ursula had 
reflected on this further, she might have identified why those features 
are present, considered the effect that they have on consumption 
choices, and judged the extent to which this marketing approach 
is acceptable. However, perhaps as with the matter of the control 
placement, she is at this moment too distracted by other things and 
insufficiently motivated to consider this issue in greater depth right 
now.
3. Because Ursula has to locate the lever for the hood, she first 
looks where her previous experiences direct her to look—perhaps 
without being fully aware of what she is doing. When this approach 
proves unsuccessful, Ursula then looks in the places where she 
expects the control might reasonably be. This move could involve 
something like the physical stance; a mechanical connection between 
the lever and the hood is tacitly assumed, and therefore the lever is 
expected to be close to the hood. Searching based on prior experience 
and on reasoning about the system’s operation is unsuccessful, 
but this repeated failure serves to bring the system prominently 
into Ursula’s consciousness and prompts her to adopt some other 
strategy.
4. In Ursula’s frustrated mutterings, we finally see our first 
clear evidence that the design stance has been adopted. In saying 
“where have they put it?” Ursula reveals her awareness that certain 
agents (“they”) are responsible for the system with which she is 
interacting, and that those same agents have taken actions (“put”) 
that have determined the location of the control she seeks. In saying, 
“I can’t have been expected to look in here!” Ursula further reveals 
her awareness that these same agents would have thought about 
her need to find the control and that they would have held some 
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image of how that control would be sought. Ursula has now shifted 
from a physical stance to a design stance: She is reasoning about 
the plausible location of the control on the basis of some imagined 
agent’s expectations of her own actions.
5. Ursula’s reasoning about the agent’s reasoning is most 
evident when she hesitates to touch the car’s badge. Ursula here 
sensibly anticipates that the agent would not have wanted her to 
unnecessarily interact with some predictably dirty part of the car. 
Ursula here attributes a user-centered perspective to the agent, and 
in doing so she almost misses her opportunity to locate the opening 
system for the hood. The design stance here works against Ursula 
because the image she has formed of the agent and the design 
process is incomplete. Without knowing all of the motivations and 
constraints that the agent was driven by, Ursula might overlook a 
broad range of technical, economic, and aesthetic influences.
6. With the opening system located, Ursula’s experience of 
the car (and her reflection on that experience) is influenced by the 
image of the agent that she has now developed. Her frustration and 
disappointment are aimed not just at the car as an inanimate object 
or at herself as an uninformed user, but also at the agents responsible 
for the car and its design. Her experience is not all negative though; 
as she reasons about the explanations for some of the system’s 
features, she gains satisfaction from feeling that her security and her 
convenience have been considered. Ursula now sees the implemen-
tation of the lock and its cover as resulting from the concerns of a 
human agent who has tried to solve problems on her behalf.
Discussion
In addition to the particular sequence of events considered in the 
commentary above, Ursula’s interaction episode points to three 
general sets of issues that warrant discussion here: First, there are 
issues of what factors prompt the adoption of the design stance; 
second, issues of whether it must really be a designer that is 
imagined; and third, issues about what knowledge of design users 
actually have. We shall now consider each of these issues in turn 
before reflecting on how such matters fit with the developing 
literature on design and interaction.
In the example with the car, our user is placed in a situation 
where her expectations have been confounded, and yet she is highly 
motivated to determine the location of the control. The car and 
its design have thus become salient in a way that they might not 
have otherwise. This idea of heightened awareness can be seen as 
an extension of Heidegger’s distinction between ready-to-hand and 
present-at-hand,54 a distinction that is commonly made in discussions 
of interaction.55 In this view, a system is seemingly non-existent to 
users (ready-to-hand) when they are focused on the work to be 
done, but the system becomes salient (present-at-hand) when some 
“break-down” occurs. The design stance takes this progression 
54 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1962, trans.).
55 For example, see Paul Dourish, Where 
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further and suggests that this present-at-hand condition can also 
lead the user to become more conscious of the designer’s actions. In 
this sense, we might expect that the design stance is more likely to 
be adopted when a system is prominent in the user’s mind, whether 
because of interest, surprise, or frustration.
Our user is not explicitly invoking some image of a designer, 
but rather some diffuse and non-specific agent, “they.” This agent 
is somehow taken to be responsible for how the system is, is 
assumed to have had some choice over how the system works, and 
is thought to have considered how the system might be used. From 
an external perspective, this might sound like the role of a designer, 
but the user need not necessarily assign that label to the agent. Users 
might recognize that systems result from various motivations and 
constraints, even if they do not explicitly consider these to be design 
issues.56 Therefore, the design stance is best considered as an analytic 
perspective on user-system interaction, rather than as a description 
of how that interaction is necessarily conceptualized by the person 
involved.
Our user’s adoption and implementation of the design stance 
is influenced by the knowledge she holds of what might generally be 
called “design,” even if she would not necessarily use that term. This 
knowledge need not be founded on reliable sources, but might be 
composed of suspicions, rumors, misinformation, and various ideas 
from popular culture. As users modify the systems they use, and 
as they devise workarounds and fixes for the systems’ deficiencies, 
they are themselves involved in design activities, and so they also 
learn about design by doing it.57 Design knowledge might thus be 
incomplete, inconsistent, and dynamic, as hints and fragments of 
information are pieced together over time from different sources. In 
this sense, knowledge of design is assembled and developed through 
the course of people’s lives and might be influential, even if it is 
inaccurate.
Conclusion
In the opening pages of The Intentional Stance, Dennett says that 
“Philosophy does not often produce stable, reliable ‘results’ the 
way science does at its best. It can, however, produce new ways of 
looking at things, ways of thinking about things, ways of framing 
the questions, ways of seeing what is important and why.”58 In line 
with this suggestion, this article has taken Dennett’s own concept of 
the design stance as a starting point for considering how users might 
respond to and interact with designed systems. A strong version 
of that concept requires the inference of design intent, and a broad 
version considers the influence that this exerts on experience, as well 
as interaction. Interpreting the design stance in this way offers a new 
perspective from which user behavior might be viewed and from 
which designed systems might be analyzed. Such a perspective fits 
with recent work on design and interaction—work that has opened 
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up to consider the full richness of human experience. With a more 
sophisticated understanding of users now gaining ground, the way 
seems well prepared for acknowledging that they can recognize 
themselves as being users and can anticipate that designers have 
designed systems with them in mind. Exploring the implications of 
users adopting such a stance has the potential to expand and refine 
our basic understanding of user-system interaction.
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank Professor Geraldine Fitzpatrick, Dr. 
Alan Blackwell, Dr. Cecily Morrison, and Dr. David Coyle for 
their guidance on earlier drafts of this material. Thanks also to the 
participants of the Cambridge Engineering Design Centre seminar, 
at which some of these ideas were first discussed and from which 
the example episode used in this article was developed.
